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25X1X7

Estimate of Chinese Communist Capabilities for Attacking India Through Burmese Territory

14 AUGUST 1963

SECRET

14 August 1963

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKING INDIA
THROUGH BURMESE TERRITORY

THE PROBLEM

To assess the maximum military force the Chinese Communists

could employ and logistically support in sustained attacks into

northeast India through Burma. The attacks considered in this paper

are those the Chinese Communists have the theoretical capability

to mount in addition to those described in "Estimate of the 25X1X7

Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against India from Tibet and Sinklang,"

dated 14 August 1963, and 'Estimate of the Communist Chinese 25X1X7

Air Threat Against India," dated 17 January 1963.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. Although this study does not estimate the reactions of the Burmese government to a Chinese Communist incursion, it is assumed that the Chinese would, as a normal military precaution, deploy security forces along their lines of communication.

- 2. The Chinese would not augment ground and air forces along China's borders with countries in southeast Asia.
- 3. The Chinese would use port and rail facilities in North Vietnam.

CONCLUSIONS

- A. In an attack on India through Burma we believe that the Chinese Communists would establish stockpiles on the Sino-Burmese frontier in the Hsin-chieh/Teng-cnung area using Kunming as their base of supply. Kunming is served by a rail line from Hanoi in North Vietnam and by road from the Chinese railhead at Anshun, and these facilities could support limited operations in the China-Burma-India theater. The Chinese could use two principal routes to move supplies through Burma: (a) the Ledo Road via Myitkyina and (b) the Lashio-Mandalay-Imphal road. (Paras. 1-2)
- B. After essential road improvements the Chinese could move a total of 940 tons per day to support ground operations in India. We estimate that the maximum ground force the Chinese could deploy in an attack into India through Burma would be about 132,500 men, equivalent to approximately nine infantry divisions under the command of an army headquarters. The most favorable period for operations in the area occurs after the beginning of the dry season in November. (Paras. 3-8)
- C. We estimate the force advancing over the Ledo Road would consist of one standard infantry division, four light infantry divisions, and one artillery regiment. The attack, we believe, would have the objective of destroying Indian forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields and the eventual link-up with Chinese forces advancing from Tibet into the eastern

part of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA). We estimate the force advancing through Imphal would consist of the major elements of two light infantry divisions and one standard infantry division. This attack, we believe, would have the objective of destroying Indian forces and, together with the attacks from Tibet, the occupation of important areas of northeast India. (Paras. 7-10)

- D. We estimate the Chinese could also support four independent infantry regiments, two north of Homalin and two through the Dipu pass. These units would be supplied by pack animals and porters, and could be supported up to 50 miles into India. If air supply were available, they could penetrate deeper. (Paras. 11-12)
- E. We believe the Chinese would employ about 395 combat aircraft in operations against northeast India. This force would probably consist of 300 MIG-15/17 jet fighters, 75 IL-28 light jet bombers, and 20 TU-2 light piston bombers. We estimate that these aircraft would provide a daily sortie rate of about 360. Approximately 120 transport aircraft would be available to support operations from Burma. (Paras. 14-18)
- F. We believe that the Chinese have the purely military resources -personnel, equipment, weapons, and ammunition -- to conduct operations
 through Burma and simultaneously attack along the Himalayan front. If such
 operations were undertaken, logistic support would require approximately 25
 percent (50,000) of the nation's truck park and, on an annual basis, more
 than 50 percent (750,000 tons) of the motor gasoline available in all of

China in 1962. It would necessitate a drastic reallocation of the nation's transportation and POL resources, and the Chinese would be confronted with extremely formidable maintenance and replacement problems. (Paras. 19-21)

- G. We believe that the Chinese could launch attacks from Tibet and Sinkiang with little or no warning. We believe the attack through Burma, on the other hand, would give Indian defenses several weeks of warning. Even if the Chinese could do the road rebuilding surreptitiously or under the guise of some peaceful purpose, the attacking columns would require approximately two weeks to close in their attack positions at the Indo-Burma border, and probably would be quickly detected. (Para. 22)
- H. The foregoing conclusions represent an estimate of the maximum feasible scale of attack across Burma against India, entailing maximum logistic difficulties and warning time. The Chinese could attack in less force with less difficulty and less warning.

DISCUSSION

I. GROUND OPERATIONS

Logistics

1. The theater of operations for a Chinese Communist offensive against India through Burma encompasses Yunnan Province in China, northern Burma,

and the states of Assam, Nagaland, and Manipur in northeast India. The Chinese would probably locate their base depot at Kumming which is served by road from the railhead at Anshun and by rail via Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam. Forward stockpiles most likely would be established in the Hsin-chieh and Teng-chung areas.

- 2. Supplies for Chinese ground forces engaged in operations in India would have to be moved over distances ranging from 800 to 1,700 miles from Kunming. The initial transportation leg would cover the route by rail between Kunming and Ipinglang, and then by road to Hsin-chieh, which is near the Sino-Burmese border some 330 miles west of Kunming. From Hsin-chieh the Chinese could move supplies across Burma to the Indo-Burmese border via the following main supply routes: (a) over the Ledo Road via Myitkyina, and (b) over the Burma Road to Mandalay and thence by way of the Mandalay-Imphal road. Some supplies could also be delivered to Mandalay via the route through Talo and Keng Tung. Available intelligence indicates that extensive road repairs and bridging to the Shingbwiyang-Pangsau Pass section of the Ledo Road and on parts of the Mandalay-Imphal road would be required before these logistic routes could support the scale of military operations envisaged. (See map at Annex.)
- 3. The limiting factor governing Chinese attacks on India from Burma would be the amount of supplies which could be moved across the Indo-Burmese frontier. We estimate that the Chinese could move a daily maximum of about

1,710 tons forward from the stockpiles at Hsin-chieh and Teng-chung. This tonnage, we believe, would be used as follows: 240 tons for engineer units, security units and forward dumping; 330 tons for motor transport; 940 tons to support ground operations in India; and 200 tons for air units in Burma.

Composition of the Attacking Forces

4. We estimate that the composition of the Chinese Communist force could include an army headquarters to provide operational control along the axes of advance, lightly equipped infantry divisions for the initial phase across the mountainous jungle terrain along the Indo-Burmese border, and an operational reserve consisting of standard infantry divisions, with their organic medium artillery and some tanks, to be employed on the Assam plain. These ground units could readily be provided from the two armies located in the Kunming Military Region, supplemented as necessary from China's strategic ground reserve.

Operational Considerations

5. Prior to the initiation of the attack, these troops probably would be staged in Chinese territory near the Sino-Burmese border. Forward movement from the staging areas would have to await necessary road repairs. We believe that essential improvement of the Ledo Road would require the employment of six engineer regiments and take up to one month. Three engineer regiments would probably be sufficient to make the necessary improvements to and maintain

the Mandalay-Imphal road. After essential road repair, it is estimated that the attack forces could close in their attack positions at the Indo-Burma border in approximately two weeks.

6. An offensive during the southwest monsoon (May-September) would be extremely difficult, but not impossible, to support logistically. The most favorable period for military operations in the area occurs after the beginning of the dry season in November. Refer to Annex D for a detailed discussion of the climatic effects on ground and air operations.

Avenues of Attack

- 7. We estimate that the Chinese would utilize two major and two cross country avenues of advance into northeast India. One major avenue leads from Pangsau Pass through Ledo and across the Digboi oil fields to Dibrugarh; the other is via Imphal, Kohima, and into Gauhati. Cross country trails lead from Bhamo via Indaw and Homalin to the Indo-Burmese frontier and from Kun-shan in Chamdo district through the Diphu Puss to Walong in Eastern Assam.
- 8. In simultaneous advances over the two principal avenues of attack into India, the Chinese could employ and logistically support a force estimated at 118,500 troops, organized into approximately eight infantry divisions under the command of an army headquarters.* Tables of personnel

^{*} The daily through-put capacities of the Ledo Road and the Mandalay-Imphal route required to support this force are 520 tons and 320 tons, respectively.

and equipment for the army headquarters and for the standard infantry division are shown in Annexes B and C, respectively. Over the two cross country trails, the Chinese could support four independent infantry regiments (14,000 troops).

- 9. Along the northern axis leading to Dibrugarh (via the Ledo Road) the Chinese force could consist of one standard infantry division and four light infantry divisions with one additional artillery regiment (74,000 troops). Chinese objectives in this attack, we believe, would be the destruction of Indian Army forces, the seizure of the Digboi oil fields, and the eventual link-up with Chinese operations from Tibet into the eastern part of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA).*
- 10. In the advance toward western Assam (via the Mandalay-Imphal route) the Chinese could employ the major elements of two light infantry divisions and one standard infantry division (44,500 troops). This attack and the attacks from Tibet would probably have the objective of destroying Indian forces and the occupation of important areas of northeast India.
- 11. To assist forces attacking on the Imphal route and from Tibet in the Rima area, the Chinese could support pack animal and porter supplied units from roadheads at Homalin in Burma and Kun-shan in China. Approximately 50 tons would be available at each place to support two infantry regiments

²⁵X1X7

^{*} Estimate of the Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against India from Tibet and Sinkiang," dated 14 August 1963.

30-50 miles north of Homalin, and an additional two regiments from Hun-shan through the Diphu Pass to the Walong area. These units could penetrate deeper if air supply was available.

12. In addition, by using surplus tonnage available on the Ledo Road at Shingbwiyang and at Myitkyina, the Chinese could support small parties of lightly equipped infantry operating on the Indian frontier north of Putao and west of Shingbwiyang. We have no intelligence on the tracks and trails in these areas but from World War II experience we believe this is possible. It is considered that the employment of these additional troops, the number of which cannot be accurately estimated, would not materially affect the Chinese capability to achieve their overall objectives in Assam.

II. AIR OPERATIONS

25X1X7

In the "Estimate of the Communist Chinese Air Threat Against India," dated 17 January 1963, 290 tactical aircraft were estimated as constituting the air threat. Of this number, we believe 100 aircraft would be based in Sinkiang for operations against the Ladakh-Jammu-Kashmir area, and 190 would be based in Tibet and southwest China for operations against northeast India. In support of operations through Burma we believe an additional 205 tactical aircraft could be employed against northeastern India. The 395 aircraft which could operate against India's eastern front would probably consist of 300 MIG-15/17s (including 40 MIG-17D limited

all-weather aircraft), 75 IL-28s, and 20 TU-2s. Locations of all aircraft are identified in Annexes E and F, and logistic requirements for this force are noted at Annex G.

- 14. There are 19 airfields within Chinasad 12 within northern Burma which could be used for the employment of Chinese Communist air forces in support of attacks against northeast India. Because of operational and logistic factors we believe only six of the former and two of the latter would be used for combat support of these attacks. We believe that logistic capabilities are sufficient to support two fighter regiments at Myitkyina South and one fighter regiment at Namponmao. A program of improving existing forward airfields in Burma and the use of airfields that may be captured in India would permit continuing forward deployment of fighter/ground attack aircraft to the immediate vicinity of the active battle area.
- 15. Jets based at Myitkyina South and Namponmao would be the only fighters that could be employed in a ground attack role. From these two bases in Burma, the fighters could provide close support to ground forces generally within an area embracing Imphal, Dibrugarh, and Sadiya in India (see map at Annex). The TU-2 aircraft, in attacks from Nagchhu Dzong airfield in Tibet, could also provide support to ground forces as far south as Imphal. The IL-28s would have the range to conduct bombing attacks and reconnaissance over northeast India and jet fighters on combat air patrol could cover all of India east of East Pakistan and Nepal.

De President

- 16. It is estimated that these Chinese Communist aircraft would provide a daily sortic rate of about 360. A likely mixture for this number of sortics would be 65 ground support and 225 air defense/combat air patrol sortics by jet fighters, with the jet light bombers conducting 55 sortics per day, and the piston light bombers conducting 15 sortics per day.
- 17. We believe that approximately 120 light and small transport aircraft could be utilized in supporting operations through Burma. The 30 IL-12s, 16 IL-14s, and 28 C-46s of the Thirteenth Air Division could deliver about 132 tons of material daily from the Chengtu area to the airfields at Myitkyina South and Namponmao as long as airborne operations were not conducted elsewhere. In addition, 7 LI-2s and 3 C-47s of the Thirteenth Air Division could operate from Kunming or Mandalay and 35 AN-2s could be located in Burma as follows: 10 at Singkaling Hkamti South, 10 at Kolemya, and 15 at Katha. The AN-2s would have the primary mission of supporting the ground forces.
- III. THE EFFECT OF BURMA OPERATIONS ON CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY CAPABILITIES FROM TIBET AND SINKLANG

25X1X7

18. In the "Estimate of the Chinese Communist Ground Threat Against India from Tibet and Sinkiang," dated 14 August 1963, we estimated that to sustain the operations described in that study for one year would require about 40,000 trucks, and approximately 600,000 tons of motor

gasoline. We then made the following judgment: "An effort of this size probably could not be supported if China were involved in significant military activity elsewhere."

- personnel, equipment, weapons, and ammunition -- to conduct operations through Burma and simultaneously attack along the Himalayan front. However, the attack through Burma would require approximately 10,000 trucks and, on an annual basis, nearly 150,000 tons of motor gasoline. Thus, if the Chinese were to launch attacks simultaneously into India from Tibet, Sinkiang and Burma, approximately 25 percent (50,000) of the nation's truck park would have to be used, and, on an annual basis, more than 50 percent (750,000 tons) of the motor gasoline available in all of China in 1962 would be consumed.
- 20. Although the Chinese could, if they wished, make available the motor transport and gasoline required to support these offensives, to do so would necessitate a drastic reallocation of the nation's transportation and POL resources. Motor and air transport would have to be redistributed from other military regions and the civilian economy would be stripped of all but a minimal level of these modes of transportation. Many organizational and managerial problems would arise, and it is questionable whether the military or civilian transportation agencies could cope with these problems. Furthermore, if this transportation effort, which would be taking place over

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extremely long and difficult roads and in areas far remote from industrial bases, were to continue for long, the Chinese would be confronted by extremely formidable maintenance and replacement problems.

21. We believe that the Chinese could launch attacks from Tibet and Sinkiang with little or no warning. We believe the attack through Burma, on the other hand, would give Indian defenses several weeks of warning. Even if the Chinese could rebuild the roads surreptitiously or under the guise of some peaceful purpose, the attacking columns would require two weeks to close in their attack positions on the Indo-Burma border and would probably be quickly detected.

DAILY RESUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTED CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY UNITS

(Short Tons Based on "Light Combat Rates" At 85% TOE)

Annex A

Class III Class V TOTAL Class II and IV Class I (All Classes) (Ammunition) Unit (Rations) (General Supplies) (POL) 0.6 20.3 4.7 9.9 Army Hq (Including 5.2 Command & Staff and Combat Support elements) 54.0 128.9 28.0 Inf Div (Standard) 24.6 22.3 28.0 76.2 3.1 Inf Div (Light) 23.6 21.5

ANNEX B

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

7	TABLE OF	PERSONNEL AND	EQUIPMENT, ARMY	HEADQUARTERS	AND COMBAT S	UPPORT ELEMENTS	(AT 100%	TOE)
-		<u>Total</u>	Cmd Grp & Staff	Arty <u>Regt</u>	Sig <u>Bn</u>	Gd <u>Bn</u>	Ren Bn	Eng Bn
Personnel:								
Officers Enlisted		783 4355	403 1581	207 1290	38 257	54 356	42 428	39 443
Total		5138	1984	1497	295	410	470	482
Equipment:								
Gun How, 15: Gun, 130/12: Mortar, 160 1MG, 7.62 m SMG, 7.62 m Carbine, 7.6 Truck, Cargo Truck, Cargo Truck, 1/4T Truck, Ambul	2 mm m m 62 mm 62 mm 6, 6x6 6, 4x2 6x4	12 12 12 72 78 2144 562 105 173	71 298 257 157 7	12 12 12 203 1075 146 90 15	64 158 33	27 66 212 64	27 339 37 31	18 42 364 31 15
Truck, Radio Motorcycle Bicycle		1 30 24			1 24 24	2	2	2
Cart Horse		96			24	12	12	48

													Annex
	TABLE O	F PERSON	NEL AND E	EQUIPME	NT, INF	ANTRY DI	VISION	(STANDAL	RD) (A	T 100%	TOE)		
	<u>Total</u>	Cmd Grp & Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Ren Co	Engr Bn	AT Bn	AA AW <u>Bn</u>	B A N <u>D</u>	Ord Plat	Arty Regt	Tk- A/G Regt	Inf Regts (each)
Personnel:													
Officers Enlisted	1819 15,766	210 710	9 134	41 283	10 129	39 443	54 364	57 376	1 37	1 37	207 1290	134 590	352 3791
Total	17,585	920	143	324	139	482	418	433	38	38	1497	724	4143
Equipment:													
How, 122-mm Gun, 76-mm Gun,AT,57/76-mm	12 12 39						12	12			12 12		9
Gun,AAAW,37/57- Mort,120-mm Mort,82-mm Rcl Rfl,57-mm	mm 12 39 81 27							12			12		9 27 9 9 18
Rcl Rfl,75-mm AA,90-mm AAMG, 12.7-mm	27 54 39 135									12			9 18 9 45
HMG, 7.62-mm LMG, 7.62-mm SMG, 7.62-mm Cbn, 7.62-mm Pistol, 7.62-mm	378 3499 8717	112 225 169	18 116 7	18 213 36	9 112 7	18 42 364 31		77 297 45	2	4 33 1	203 1075 146	156 280 181	117 919 2038 414
Flamethrower Tank, med Armd Recon Veh Aslt Gun, SU 76	Unk 32 3 / 12		Unk									32 3 12	
100 Trk, Cargo,6x6 Trk, Cargo,4x2	382† 107	6 70	Unk			15		25 10			90 15	12 12	78

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

С

													Annex C
	<u>Total</u>	Cmd Grp & Staff	Chem Co	Sig Bn	Ren Co	Engr Bn	AT <u>Bn</u>	AA AŴ <u>Bn</u>	B A N <u>D</u>	Ord Plat	Arty Regt	Tk- A/G Regt	Inf Regts (each)
Equipment Cont'd:													
Trk, 1/4T Trk, Ambulance	36 4	8 4						1			5	4	6
Motorcycle Bicycle	25 12		5	6 15			2					12	
Cart Horse	396† 780†	45 135		33		45†							117† 189†

ANNEX D

THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE ON GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA AREA

I. GROUND OPERATIONS

- 1. Southwest Monsoon. Mid-May through September is quite warm and humid. Day temperatures are in the 80's (°F.) and 90's, lowering to the 60's and 70's at night, except cooler temperatures are common at higher elevations. Relative humidity averages 80 percent or more much of the time. Cloudiness ranges 8/10 or more during the morning at most places, with convective clouds in the afternoon and evening covering 7/10 or more of the sky. Precipitation generally averages from 10 to 20 inches per month, with some exposed slopes receiving more than 25 inches. Thunderstorms are common in the spring and the southwest monsoon seasons. Their frequency is determined by local conditions; at some locations thunderstorms occur on 50 percent of the days in some months. This season would clearly be the most unfavorable one for most military operations.
- 2. Autumn. Mostly during the month of October, is the transition season from the wet southwest monsoon to the dry northeast monsoon.
- 3. The Northeast Monsoon. November to about mid-March is the dry winter season. Precipitation is at a minimum, averaging less than two inches per month at most places. Cloudiness is usually scattered to broken with little diurnal variation. Temperatures are mostly in the 60's and 70's during the day, dropping to 40's or 50's at night; freezing temperatures may occur at higher elevations. Relative humidities are generally high in the morning, averaging 70 percent or more at most locations and lowering to a minimum during the afternoon and evening. This would be the most favorable season for most military operations.

ANNEX D

4. Spring. Generally from mid-March through mid-May is the transition from the dry winter to the wet summer. Over much of this sector, temperatures reach a maximum just before the onset of the southwest monsoon, averaging a few degrees warmer than in the summer. Thunderstorms are common with the advance of the southwest monsoon.

II. AIR OPERATIONS

- 1. Weather conditions are least favorable for air operations during the southwest monsoon season, when cloudiness and precipitation are at a maximum. Convective-type clouds are predominant with frequent layers of middle and high clouds. Cloudiness is generally most predominant over the southwest slopes and peaks of the mountains. Thunderstorms and showers are frequent in this season. Aircraft icing is most hazardous near 15,000 to 18,000 feet. Flying conditions are generally worse during the one or two expected tropical storms per season in this region. Winds aloft are mostly southerly, shifting to southeasterly at about 10,000 feet.
- 2. Weather conditions are generally favorable for air operations during the northeast monsoon season. However, strong westerly winds above 20,000 feet are sometimes present. Aircraft icing may occur at times above 10,000 to 13,000 feet, but is usually not a major problem since cloudiness is at a minimum.

Annex E

Air	field Name	Distance to Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface	Estimate of Part Tactical Ftrs	icipating Air Bombers	reraft <u>Trspts</u>
1.	Lhasa	180	30 [°] 30'N 91°05'E	14,000 (AMSL)	13,000	Asphalt	60 Mig 15/17 s		
2.	Nagchhu Dzong	220	31 ⁰ 33'N 91 ⁰ 43'E	15,000 (AMSL)	12,000	Crushed Rock		(20 Tu-2s (25 Il-28s	
3•	Yushu	220	32 ⁰ 53'N 96 ⁰ 47'E	12,500 (AMSL)	8,000	Crushed Rock	30 Mig 15/17s		
4.	Kantzu	270	31°37'N 100°12'E	11,500 (AMSL)	14,000	Crushed Rock			
5•	Chengtu/ Feng-Huang-Sha	360 in	30°44'N 104°00'E	1,640 (AMSL)	4,600	Macadam			
6.	Kuanghan	370	30 ⁰ 57'N 104 ⁰ 20'E	1,640 (AMSL)	8,300	Macadam			(30 Il - 12s
7•	Chengtu/Wenchiar	ng 315	30 ⁰ 43'N 103 ⁰ 57'E	1,700 (AMSL)	7,500	Concrete	30 M ig 15/17s ^a /	25 Il-28s	(28 C-46s (16 Il-14s
8.	Chengtu/ Shuangliu	310	30°35'N 103°57'E	1,640 (AMSL)	7,200	Concrete			
9•	Chengtu/ Taiping SSU	350	30 ⁰ 16'N 104 ⁰ 01'E	1,640 (AMSL)	5,000	Macadam			
10.	Hsinching	340	30 ⁰ 25'N 103 ⁰ 51'E	1,500 (AMSL)	7,000	Macadam			
11.	Hsichang	195	27 ⁰ 55'N 102 ⁰ 13'E	5,000 (AMSL)	4,900	Macadam			

6,420

(AMSL)

25⁰27'**N** 100⁰44'E

130

AIRFIELDS AND AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN TIBET AND SOUTHWEST CHINA

12. Peitun

6,600 Macadam

Annex E

Air	field Name(Cont'd	Distance to Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface	Estimate of Part Tactical Ftrs	icipating Ai Bombers	rcraft Trspts
13.	Paoshan	65	25 ⁰ 04 'N 99 [°] 09 'E	5,490 (AMSL)	4,900	Macadam			
14.	Mangshih	25	24 ⁰ 24'N 98 ⁰ 31'E	3,020 (AMSL)	5,600	Sod			
15.	Kunming	230	25 ⁰ 00'N 102 ⁰ 45'E	6,240 (AMSL)	9,500	Concrete	60 Mig 15/17s ^{a/}	25 I1- 28s	
16.	Mengsa	40	23 ⁰ 43'N 99 ⁰ 37'E	4,500 (AMSL)	8,000	Sod			
17.	Ssumao North	85	22 ⁰ 47'N 100 [°] 57'E	4,120 (AMSL)	6,800	Macadam			
18.	Menghsi	10	22 ⁰ 00'N 100 ⁰ 16'E	4,800 (AMSL)	4,300	Sod			
19.	Mengtzu West	215	23°24'N 103°19'E	4,720 (AMSL)	8,200	Concrete	30 Mig 15/17s ^a /		

a/ Includes 10 Mig 17D aircraft.

Annex F

AIRFIELDS AND CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE IN NORTHERN BURMA

<u>Air</u>	field Name	Distance to Indian Border (NM)	Coords	Elevation ft.	Length ft.	Surface and run- way con- dition	Estimate of Participating Tactical Ftrs Bombers	GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and
1.	Putao	15	27 ⁰ 20'N 97 ⁰ 26'E	1,490	6,000	Clay, Fair		. 1 om aut
2.	Singkaling Hkamti South	30	25 ⁰ 28'N 95 ⁰ 41'E	600	4,200	Gravel, Good		GROUP 1
3•	Namponmao	125	25 ⁰ 21'N 97 ⁰ 17'E	470	6,600	Asphalt, Good	30 Mig 15/17s (Includes 10 Mig 17-Ds)	Exclu
4.	M yitkyina South	135	25 ⁰ 22'N 97 ⁰ 21'E	472	6,000	Asphalt, Good	60 Mig 15/17s	
5.	Katha	100	24 ⁰ 09'N 96 ⁰ 19'E	320	5,280	Laterite, Good		15 AN-2s
6.	Bhamo	140	24 ⁰ 16'N 97 ⁰ 15'E	360	6,060	Asphalt, Poor		
7.	Kalemyo	40	23°11'N 94°04'E	100	4,200	Laterite, Good		10 AN-2s
8.	Mongmit	150	23 ⁰ 06' N 96 ⁰ 39'E	600	5,280	Gravel, Fair		
9.	Lashio	210	22 ⁰ 58'N 97 ⁰ 45'E	2,450	4,500	Bitumen, Good		
10.	Gangaw	50	22 ⁰ 11'N 94'08'E	700	3 , 600	Gravel, Fair		
11.	Monywa	115	22 ⁰ 13'N 95 ⁰ 05'E	260	4,900	Gravel, Fair		(
12.	Mandalay	160	21 ⁰ 56'N 96 ⁰ 05'E	250	4,000	Bitumen, Fair		(7 Li-2s (3 C-47s (These aircraft would also operate from Kunming)

Excluded from autom downgrading and declassification

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Annex G

AIR LOGISTICS-TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Air A.		ds & Aircraft		POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock	Ammo & Bombs	Tech Supplies	Common Use Items Includes Personnel	Total Short Tons
	1.	LHASA						
		60 Mig 15/17s with Air Tech- nical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Air Defense/ Combat Air Patrol (CAP)	84	8	2	10	104
	2.	NAGCHHU DZONG						
		25 Il-28s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Bomb/Rec	137	40	3	6	186
		20 Tu-2s with Air Technical Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	Ground Support	18	20	2	3 TOTAL	<u>43</u> 333 ⁸ /
	3•	YUSHU						
		30 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Bat- talion (ATB) & Maint Personnel	n Air Defense/CA	P 42	4	1	5 TOTAL	<u>52</u> 52 ^{b/}

Annex G

Common POL & LUB Use Items Total A/C and Includes Short Airfields & Aircraft Mission Rolling Stock Tech Supplies Ammo & Bombs Personnel Tons 4. CHENGTU/WENCHIANG 30 Mig 15/17s 42 4 Air Defense/ 1 5 52 with Air Techni-CAP cal Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel 25 IL-28s with Bomb/Rec 40 6 186 137 3 Air Technical 238^c/ Battalion (ATB) TOTAL & Maint Personnel 5. KUNMING 60 Mig 15/17s 8 Air Defense/ 84 2 10 104 with Air Techni-CAP cal Battalion (ATB) & Maint Personnel 25 Il-28s with Bomb/Rec 137 40 6 186 3 Air Technical 290<u>a</u>/ Battalion (ATB) TOTAL & Maint Personnel 6. MENGTZU WEST 30 Mig 15/17s with Air Tech-Air Defense/ 42 1 <u>52</u> CAP 52<u>ª</u>/ nical Battalion TOTAL (ATB) & Maint Personnel

Annex G

Airfields & Aircraft	Mission	POL & LUB A/C and Rolling Stock	Ammo & Bombs	Tech Supplies	Common Use Items Includes Personnel	Total Short Tons
B. BURMESE AIRFIELDS						•
1. MYITKYINA						
60 Mig 15/17s with Air Technical Battalion (ATE) & Maint Personnel	Ground At- tack, Air Defense, CAP	64	20	2	10	96
2. NAMPONMAO						
30 Mig 15/17s with Air Tech- nical Battalion (ATB) & Maint	Ground At- tack, Air Defense	36(14) ^{<u>e</u>/}	7 (2) ^{<u>e</u>/}	1 (. 5)≝∕	5 (3) ^{<u>e</u>/} Tot	<u>49</u> (19.5) ^{e/} PAL 145 ^{£/}
Personnel				25X1X7		

- a/ This 333 tons is provided from the 500 tons referred to in para 25 of the Estimate, dated 17 January 1963.
- b/ This tonnage provided by truck from Hsining-Lanchou railhead. It is not a restrictive factor in this problem.
- c/ This tonnage is not a restrictive factor due to proximity of major railhead.
- \underline{d} / Approximatedly 350 short tons per day are required and available to support these air operations out of the total tonnage deliverable daily to Kurming.
- e/ Figures in parentheses indicate Mig-17D requirements. They are parts of rather than additions to the totals. This breakout included here to distinguish Mig-17D air defense mission from ground attack mission of remaining 20 jet fighters.
- f/ With the exception of the first 6-8 days of operations or during the rainy season when certain road systems may be temporarily inoperable, this tonnage will be provided overland by truck. During periods when air supply is necessary, it will be accomplished largely by Thirteenth Air Division aircraft operating from the Chengtu airfield complex. Approximately 132 tons could be delivered daily from this railhead location using 30 II-12s, 16 II-14s and 28 C-46s on a 50% serviceability basis. In addition, 7 Li-2s and 3 C-47s, operating from either Kumming or Mandalay, could easily supply the remaining 13 tons. Another factor favoring adequate tonnage at these two fields is that transports probably would be able to operate about 25% more flying days than the fighter aircraft they were supporting.





